{"id":7321,"date":"2019-11-30T13:07:59","date_gmt":"2019-11-30T13:07:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/?p=7321"},"modified":"2019-11-30T13:08:01","modified_gmt":"2019-11-30T13:08:01","slug":"symposium-on-institutional-innovations-in-the-enforcement-of-eu-law-and-policies","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/?p=7321","title":{"rendered":"Symposium on Institutional Innovations in the Enforcement of EU Law and Policies"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Much is being said, lately, regarding the effectiveness of EU policies, often arguing that their implementation is too poor or \nuneven throughout the Union. Enforcing EU laws is crucial for their successful implementation; however, how should enforcement \nbe organised? At which level, by what type of institutions and what implications does the choice for a particular \ninstitutional strategy have in terms of legitimacy, organization of controls and operation of enforcement? The European \nCommission itself is committed to making EU laws more effective and improving overall compliance with them. What is most \nrelevant is the ongoing changes in the governance of EU law enforcement, according to which direct enforcement powers, long \nbeen regarded an exclusive competence of the EU Member States, are increasingly being uplifted at the supranational level, \nboth by providing EU actors with direct powers and through unprecedented shared powers with the lower administrative levels.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The special issue of the European Journal of Risk Regulation<\/a>, that we have co-edited, focuses on the institutional innovations \nin the field of EU law enforcement. It aims at promoting research in the so far understudied field of enforcement of EU laws \nand policies. Its contributions address the questions ranging from how enforcement has been organized in EU policy fields and \nwhat we could learn for future design of enforcement institutions, with a special focus on the issues of effectiveness and the \nrule of law. It does so by gathering experts from different disciplines to contribute to building common knowledge by \nproviding (comparative) case studies and much needed assessment frameworks.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The special issue starts with two contributions focusing on possible explanations of why and when specific types of \nenforcement institutions have been selected.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/a><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

Van Kreij<\/a> offers a framework to investigate and understand the EU legislator\u2019s choice between EU agency, EU network and a \nnational enforcement authority. He offers also two illustrations \u2013 the cases of Consumer Protection Cooperation network and \nEnvironmental Crimes Directive \u2013 showing how this framework could be applied by researchers and practitioners assessing and \ndesigning enforcement regimes.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Maggetti<\/a> takes an opposite, \u2018negative case\u2019 of enforcement to discuss the question of when certain institutions could be \nselected to enforce EU laws and policies or thus not. He investigates the case of Energy Regulation and the Agency for the \nCooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). What is interesting with this specific agency is that it acts like a negative case, \nas it has not been attributed such competences although positive conditions are present. Maggetti argues that the differences \nin the attribution of enforcement powers in this case should depend on the role of interest groups.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Interrelated with the question of the creation of an EU enforcement authority is the issue of effectiveness. How can we \nmeasure effectiveness of enforcement institutions? Martinius and Mastenbroek<\/a> offer an evaluation framework to assess European \nadministrative networks on their potential to spur innovative collaboration, and they apply it to the European Network of \nProsecutors for the Environment (ENPE).<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cacciatore<\/a> focuses on the effectiveness and governance aspects in enforcement of the European System of Financial Supervision, \nand shows that both degrees of organisational change and perceptions of the concrete effectiveness and legitimacy of the new \nEU governance may vary, according to the different patterns of networked enforcement governance emerging in the subfields of \nfinancial surveillance.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cacciatore and Eliantonio<\/a> consider the innovative enforcement governance within the fisheries sector, namely networked \nenforcement through data sharing. They focus on the analysis of corresponding political and judicial accountability \nmechanisms, and find out that networked enforcement is prevalent in fisheries\u2019 data sharing, yet the mechanisms of both \npolitical and judicial accountability have not been able to keep up with this novel institutional arrangement.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, Scholten<\/a> argues that the proliferation of the shared administration in the EU affects the organization of controls \nfor such a system. A number of developments \u2013 proliferation of enforcement, proliferation of mixed forms of decision-making, \ntechnological changes \u2013 require establishing not only shared types of decision-making procedures but also merge the systems of \ncontrols belonging to different jurisdictions, types and concepts of control. she offers her first observations on what issues \ncould be connected in future research and legislative design. She illustrates the added value of connecting with an example of \nthe Single Supervisory Mechanism.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Originally posted in the Cambridge Core blog<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Much is being said, lately, regarding the effectiveness of EU policies, often arguing that their implementation is too poor or uneven throughout the Union. Enforcing EU laws is crucial for their successful implementation; however, how should enforcement be organised? At which level, by what type of institutions and what implications does the choice for a … Continue reading “Symposium on Institutional Innovations in the Enforcement of EU Law and Policies”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":135,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7321","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-general"],"post_mailing_queue_ids":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7321","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/135"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=7321"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7321\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7328,"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7321\/revisions\/7328"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=7321"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=7321"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=7321"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}