{"id":7550,"date":"2020-06-30T12:00:00","date_gmt":"2020-06-30T12:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/?p=7550"},"modified":"2020-06-30T13:13:10","modified_gmt":"2020-06-30T13:13:10","slug":"the-eu-response-to-covid-19-the-new-temporary-framework-of-state-aid-control","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/?p=7550","title":{"rendered":"The EU Response to Covid-19: the New Temporary Framework of State Aid Control"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">\n\nThe rules on state aid have been some of the first to be <i>challenged<\/i> by Covid-19 for the obvious reason that the pandemic had immediate economic repercussions on virtually any sectors, thus requiring <i>instant<\/i> financial support from several if not all of the EU Members states (plus the UK). On the 16th of March, Competition Commissioner Vestager sent to Member States for consultation a draft proposal for a State aid Temporary Framework to support the economy in the context of the Covid-19 outbreak. On the 19th, the Commission adopted what would become the first version of a <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=uriserv:OJ.CI.2020.091.01.0001.01.ENG&amp;toc=OJ:C:2020:091I:TOC\">Temporary Framework<\/a> (TF) that acknowledged the necessity of Member States to act swiftly and, at the same time, laid down the options available to the same Member States in terms of state aid. The word \u201cTemporary\u201d refers to the time limit of these measures, which will be in place until the end of 2020. The fist temporary framework was developed mainly to ensure that sufficient liquidity remains available to businesses of all types and to preserve the continuity of economic activity during and after the Covid-19 outbreak.\n\n<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\u201d><a href=\" https:=\"\" eulawenforcement.com=\"\" ?p=\"7550&quot;\"><!--more--><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">\n\nOn the 4th of April, a <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/PDF\/?uri=CELEX:52020XC0404(01)&amp;from=IT\">first amendment<\/a> was introduced to enable Member States to do whatever is possible on the research, testing and production of coronavirus relevant products. Finally, on the 13th of May, a <a href=\"https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2020.164.01.0003.01.ENG&amp;toc=OJ:C:2020:164:TOC\">second amendment<\/a> was adopted. This introduced rather new substantive provisions, as it dealt with possible long term repercussions such as recapitalisations and subordinated debt to companies in need. \n\n<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">\n\n<i>The TF provisions<\/i>\n \n<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">\n\nThe TF acknowledges that Covid-19, in addition to being a major public health emergency, also represents <i>a major shock to both the global and Union\u2019s economies<\/i> and that, unlike any other past crisis, it is having an impact on every single sector of the economy. The Framework, therefore, addresses an extensive range of possible state interventions: from sector-specific support to more general measures to incentivise the flow of liquidity, access to credit, and recapitalization of affected undertakings. Finally, the Framework also emphasizes that this is really not the time for a harmful race on subsidies. In the Commission\u2019s view, a coordinated and proportionate application of state aid rules would be vital in preserving at least some level of European solidarity. The TF contains a reminder to Member States and provides them with two options. The reminder is that not every measure would need to be qualified as aid measure, since horizontal expenditures (that is, those applicable across the economic sectors) are obviously not caught by state aid control as they are not deemed anti-competitive per se. In reality, the TF exempts de facto also any grant linked to R&amp;D projects on Covid-19 and on other research related <i>\u2018to vaccines, medicinal products and treatments, medical devices and hospital and medical equipment, disinfectants, and protective clothing and equipment, and into relevant process innovations for an efficient production of the required products.\u2019<\/i>  \n<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">\n\nAs for the options available to Member States for deploying aid, the TF envisages two compatible cases mainly: <br>\na) Art.107 (2)(b) requires <i>de jure<\/i> the European Commission to declare aid \u2018to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences\u2019 as compatible; <br>\nb) Article 107 (3) allows the Commission to authorize aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State.<br>\nAs for option a), it is interesting to note that the Commission qualified Covid-19 as \u2018an exceptional occurrence\u2019. This is probably correct, but it also means that there is still a duty to notify the measure to the Commission whilst damages occurred because of national disasters can be exempted from such a duty under the General Block Exemption Regulation. After the notification, the Commission must always verify the exceptionality of the situation and that the following conditions are met: the damage for which the compensation is granted must be a direct consequence of the natural disaster; the aid cannot result in overcompensation for damage; and the aid can only rectify the damage caused by the natural disaster. <br><br>\n\nAn interesting point to note is that the Framework further specifies how Covid-19 related measures would be applied in relation to the Rescue and Restructuring (R&amp;R) Guidelines. According to the Commission, the principle of \u2018one time last time\u2019 would not apply to aid declared compatible under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU. The practical consequence of this specification is that Member States can still compensate the damages directly caused by the Covid-19 outbreak to undertakings that have already received aid under the R&amp;R Guidelines. <br><br>\n\nMost of the Temporary Framework, however, is devoted to the possible use of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, that makes aid to <i>\u2018to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State\u2019<\/i> compatible with EU law. The Framework, mostly based on principles developed in the context of the banking crises and by relying on a series of macro-economic indicators, lists several types of aid which would be deemed compatible if all were aimed at addressing short term liquidity issues. It mainly provides that direct grants, selective tax advantages and advance payments could be compatible and that Member States will be able to set up schemes to grant up to \u20ac800,000 to a company to address its urgent liquidity needs; the other and somehow \u2018cheap\u2019 type of measure is the provision of state guarantees for loans taken by companies from banks, and ultimately direct loans to companies \u2013 that is Member States will be able to grant loans with favorable interest rates to companies. <br><br>\n\nThe TF is also well aware that Covid-19 will not only affect short-term liquidity but it may have the effect of preventing a company from making a major investment or renewing its production line and so on. Thus, in its most recent amendment, the TF allows Member States to notify even those measures that would involve the recapitalization of undertakings in basically all forms: equity (capital injections-new shares) and hybrid capital instruments (bonds). Recapitalisation however can only be granted to beneficiaries that were not in difficulty before the outbreak (31 December 2019) and would otherwise encounter serious difficulty maintaining operations. Eligible companies must also be unable to find financing from the market on affordable terms.\n\n<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">\n\n<i>The TF: a first assessment<\/i>\n \n<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">\n\nDifferently from previous experiences such as the financial crises, the Commission was quick in reacting and laid down an extensive new framework in a very short period of time. Member States duly notified a considerable number of measures that were duly approved &#8211; usually in around 48 hours &#8211; by the Commission. Some concerns have been expressed on whether the adoption of the TF is actually a simple suspension of the application of state aid rules. Arguable, while some state measures are very straightforward, others are way too complex for a proper assessment to take only 48 hours. In particular, recapitalization measures are usually complex operations and tend to have also lasting effect in the segment of the affected market. <br><br>\n\nThe TF attempts to provide for some \u2018checks\u2019 which are pretty robust and, from a \u2018corporate law\u2019 point of view, rather intrusive. For instance, it requires that states should lay down mechanisms as to incentivize the redemption of the state\u2019s stake in a company or very specific parameters to fix the price of equity. Furthermore, some <i>ad hoc<\/i> anti-competitive measures are also included: the beneficiaries of recapitalisation measures cannot redistribute dividends and grant bonuses until the State is \u2018out\u2019 and as long 75% or more of the State\u2019s recapitalisation measures have yet to be redeemed, the remuneration of the beneficiary\u2019s management cannot exceed pre-outbreak levels. There is also a strict acquisition control rule: as long as 75% or more of the State\u2019s recapitalisation measures have not been redeemed, beneficiaries (other than SMEs) must not acquire more than a 10% stake in competitors or other operators in the same line of business without the Commission\u2019s approval. All these conditions are particularly rigid and it will have to be seen how the Commission decisional practice will evolve. \n \n \n<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">\n\nOn the 25th of June, the Commission authorized a \u20ac6 billion recapitalisation of Lufthansa. Germany submitted a business plan of redemption by 2026. Interestingly, Germany provided that if the exit of the State will be in doubt six years after receiving the recapitalization aid, then a restructuring plan for Lufthansa will be notified to the Commission \u2013 thus making \u2018ordinary\u2019 state aid rules applicable again. The plan also included measures to preserve effective competition, such as the divestment of up to 24 slots\/day at Frankfurt and at Munich\u2019s airports. \n\n<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">\n\nOnly time will tell if the TF will be successful in keeping spending decisions of the Member States within the parameters of fair competition and free movement that state aid control is supposed to protect.\n \n<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-size: 12pt;\">\n\n<br><i>\nFor a more complete analysis, see A. Biondi \u201cGoverning the Interregnum: EU state aid control in times of Covid-19\u201d in Market and Competition Law Review, 2020, forthcoming. \n<\/i>\n \n<\/span><\/p>\n<!-- AddThis Advanced Settings generic via filter on the_content --><!-- AddThis Share Buttons generic via filter on the_content -->","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The rules on state aid have been some of the first to be challenged by Covid-19 for the obvious reason that the pandemic had immediate economic repercussions on virtually any sectors, thus requiring instant financial support from several if not all of the EU Members states (plus the UK). On the 16th of March, Competition &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/?p=7550\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;The EU Response to Covid-19: the New Temporary Framework of State Aid Control&#8221;<\/span><\/a><!-- AddThis Advanced Settings generic via filter on get_the_excerpt --><!-- AddThis Share Buttons generic via filter on get_the_excerpt --><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":168,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[11],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7550","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-competition-law"],"post_mailing_queue_ids":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7550","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/168"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=7550"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7550\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7559,"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7550\/revisions\/7559"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=7550"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=7550"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/eulawenforcement.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=7550"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}