Uncategorized – EU Law Enforcement

When Seeing Isn’t Believing: Deepfakes, Financial Markets, and the Limits of EU Enforcement

In finance, trust is everything, but what happens when even our eyes and ears fail us? Recent cases show this is no longer a theoretical concern. Deepfake technology, powered by neural networks trained on massive datasets, can analyze audio, video, and images to produce highly realistic impersonations and edits, creating increasingly convincing fake media. This then could be used by fraudsters to commit crime. example, in one incident, a multinational corporation lost 25 million USD after fraudsters used deepfake video technology to impersonate its CFO during a live video call. In another, British energy executive wired funds after “speaking” with someone he thought was his CEO, only to later discover the voice was synthetic. Scenarios like these are now increasingly common. In a recent article, I co-authored with Dr. Michal Lavi, “Seeing is Believing? Deepfakes in Financial Markets,” we examine this emerging phenomenon, and suggest that more preventive enforcement strategy needs to be used to address this issue.

The First Steps of the Aruban Fair Trade Authority as an Antitrust Enforcer

*A conversation with Director Kross and Dr. Wessel Geursen

Earlier this year, one of the editors of eulawenforcement.com had the chance to discuss the interesting topic of the gestation of a competition authority and the challenges it faces in its first years of existence. This issue was at the core of the event ‘Competition law enforcement overseas: an interactive discussion with the Aruba Fair Trade Authority (AFTA)’, organized by the RENFORCE Building Block ‘Public Interest Ecosystems’ (PIE) at Utrecht Law School. In what follows below, we describe some of the main takeaways of our insightful conversation with the Director of the Aruban Fair Trade Authority (AFTA) Ernesto Kross and Dr. Wessel Geursen, a competition lawyer and specialist on the territorial scope of application of EU law.

Mental Accounting and Market Definition in Antitrust: How Behavioral Biases Reshape Competitive Boundaries

In the intricate world of antitrust law, the definition of a relevant market stands as a cornerstone of competition analysis, yet its foundational assumptions are increasingly being questioned. This process, which identifies the boundaries of competition between firms, has traditionally relied on the model of a rational consumer. However, the growing body of knowledge in behavioral economics challenges this paradigm, a shift now formally acknowledged by regulators.

[REPOST] From coordination to cooperation, a step change in EU competition law enforcement

As markets become increasingly cross-border, the landscape for EU competition enforcement is evolving. The review of Regulation 1/2003 offers a unique chance to take the next step: from coordination to genuine cooperation, through joint investigations and joint decisions.

Practitioner Networks complementing the Compliance Assurance Toolkit in EU environmental law

EU environmental law forms the foundation of approximately 80% of all national environmental regulations. At the same time, national authorities are struggling with significant difficulties in enforcing EU environmental law, one reason being that violations of environmental law rarely involve infringements of subjective rights. Therefore, in the environmental sector, the EU institutions need to play a crucial role in ensuring compliance with EU law by using or providing supranational compliance assurance instruments.

Can the Public Be Trusted? Navigating the Complex Terrain of Voluntary Compliance in Modern Regulation

In the evolving landscape of regulatory governance, few concepts generate as much enthusiasm—and skepticism—as voluntary compliance. Across jurisdictions and different regulatory domains, policymakers increasingly champion the notion that citizens and regulated entities should comply with the law not through coercion, but through intrinsic motivation and shared commitment to public goals. This aspiration promises to transform adversarial regulatory relationships into cooperative partnerships, reduce enforcement costs, and foster genuine behavioral change rather than mere box-ticking compliance.

Yet as Yuval Feldman’s forthcoming book Can the Public be Trusted? The Promise and Perils of Voluntary Compliance (Cambridge University Press, 2025) demonstrates, the reality of implementing voluntary compliance strategies reveals a far more nuanced picture. Focusing on three main case studies in tax, environmental behavior, and public health, the book poses a fundamental question that challenges regulatory orthodoxy: if voluntary compliance offers such compelling benefits, why do regulatory agencies worldwide continue to default to deterrence-based approaches?

Regulation as Agreement: Rethinking the Hard–Soft Divide

Introduction

It is common to view agreements between regulators and regulated entities, such as enforcement settlements, voluntary compliance agreements, and even permits and licenses, as a specific regulatory tool grounded in negotiation, exchange, and consensus. In a forthcoming article in the Harvard Negotiation Law Review, titled “The Hidden Nature of Regulation,” I offer an alternative view and suggest that all types of regulation–including command-and-control (c&c), self-regulation, voluntary programs, regulatory sandboxes, disclosure, and “naming and shaming”– are based on agreements between government regulators and regulated entities (e.g. corporations and businesses).

Data Protection Rights Born of Recent Reform in Georgian Law

Introduction

On June 14, 2023, the Parliament of Georgia took a significant step toward safeguarding personal privacy by adopting a new Law “On Personal Data Protection”. Entering into force on March 1, 2024, the legislation marks a transformative shift in Georgia’s legal framework for data protection, aligning it more closely with the European Union’s (EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Quis custodies ipsos custodes? Vivacom Bulgaria (C‑369/23) and the relationship between ‘two autonomies’ of EU law

In 1861, Mill wondered how to hold to account Parliament, which checks the Ministers’ actions, but whose own behaviour is subject to little control. A similar logic is inherent to another branch of government: the judiciary. Legislation usually sets up a system of remedies against wrongful decisions; however, what if the court of last instance disregarded the law?

The proper mechanism of EU law answering to this question is judicial liability as per the Köbler case. Alongside the actions in Articles 258-259 TFEU and other non-EU remedies, this latter judgment enforces the duty laid down in Art.267(3) TFEU. Pursuant to the abovementioned legal framework, a Member State must compensate the injury caused by a manifest breach of the acquis on the part of a court of last instance (see also the Hochtief Solutions case, para. 41-43).

New book ‘Regulation in Australia’ by Arie Freiberg

In May 2025 a second edition of Regulation in Australia was published.

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the nature of regulation, its origins and development in Australia, why governments regulate, how they regulate, and who regulates whom at the federal, state and local government levels. Management of the regulatory process, the principles of good regulation and ‘red tape’ in regulation are examined. The role of soft law, prescriptive, performance-based and principle-based regulation, as well as the use of rewards and incentives in regulation is also explored.