[DRAFT] Blogpost: Eurojust goes global: A good look or a grey zone?

By Lotte and Sterre

Eurojust, the EU agency for judicial cooperation, signed new Working Arrangements with five Latin American states in 2024 and presented it as a step forward to fight serious cross-border crime. But behind the headlines, deeper questions emerge: is the EU staying true to its core values, or is it quietly stretching the limits of its legitimacy and external influence? This blog argues that while Eurojust’s new alliances rest on solid legal foundations, they risk undermining the EU’s core values due to third states’ governmental vulnerabilities and unclear results of the Working Arrangements.

Eurojust’s global push
Eurojust is experienced in cross-border cooperation. Created under Article 85 TFEU, its mission is to support cooperation between national judicial authorities but can also cooperate with third countries through working arrangements. These are non-binding agreements that allow Eurojust to share strategic information, and provide legal and operational support without transferring legal powers.

The 2024 Working Arrangements with Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru marks a step further in the earlier established multilateral agreement between Eurojust and the Ibero-American Association of Public Prosecutors Offences. By formalising this cooperation Eurojust steps up its game in fighting transnational issues like drug trafficking, money laundering, and cybercrime. The critical question of this blog is:

Does cooperation like this reflect the EU’s core values or quietly conflict with them?

The limits of legitimacy
Concerning legitimacy of the agreements, the Working Arrangements rests on a solid legal ground. Article 47 of the Eurojust Regulation authorises Eurojust to enter into these agreements. But legitimacy is not just about whether an agency has the formal authority to act. It is also about why and to what result it exercises that authority.

Article 21 TEU, which focusses on the external action of the EU, requires the EU’s external action to reflect and promotes its values, including democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. These are not optional ideals but binding constitutional commitments. Therefore, even if Eurojust is legally entitled to sign Working Arrangements, these partnerships must also align with the substance of Article 21 TEU.

Partners with problems
The Working Arrangements target crime cooperation and not domestic governance, however problems in domestic governance could still raise Article 21 TEU concerns. The five states have been criticised for both human rights violations and weak judicial independence. Amnesty International criticised Ecuador for lack of judiciary’s independence and police attacks on journalists during protest. Peru was stated to have a severe deterioration in judicial independence and rule of law. Furthermore, Bolivia was criticised for their severe penalties for drug trafficking and possession. Bolivians charged with drug offences, independent of the severity of the offence, receive a sentence of 25 years in prison without the possibility of pre-trial release and are held in overcrowded and unsupervised prisons. With Eurojust working together to tackle the very issue of which these countries are so often criticised, it raises the question:

Could Eurojust legitimately cooperate with third countries in criminal justice matters, if those do not uphold the same principles as the EU tries to promote?

Where’s the evidence?
This disconnect is further complicated by the lack of clear, measurable outcomes from these arrangements. Eurojust’s 2023 Annual Report praised its international cooperation efforts but did not provide concrete data linking specific Working Arrangements to measurable results. Without clarity on the Working Arrangements have achieved, it becomes difficult to assess whether these are justified.

In practice this leaves a grey area: while Eurojust points to general success in cross-border crime operation, it cannot demonstrate that this success is attributable to specific arrangements, such as the Working Arrangements with Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador or Peru. This becomes especially problematic considering the human rights issues surrounding the Working Arrangement states. Without clear data demonstrating that cooperation leads to results such as dismantling drug trafficking networks or preventing cybercrime, Eurojust risks exposing itself to criticisms of compromising values and Article 21 TEU for uncertain gains.

Non-binding but symbolic weight
To counter this all, it is important to note that the degree of cooperation introduced in the Working Arrangement remains limited. The Working Arrangements are explicitly non-binding, do not involve the exchange of personal data, and do not impose obligations on either Eurojust or the other states to engage in specific activities. However, even limited cooperation can carry symbolic weight. Entering into formal arrangements with countries that face serious allegations of human rights abuses may be interpreted as normalisation of their domestic shortcomings. Thus, the legal non-bindingness does not set Eurojust free from normative criticisms relating to the values enshrined in Article 21 TEU.

A risky balancing act
Ultimately, the Working Arrangements highlight the EU’s ambition to play a more global role in justice and security. On the one hand, Eurojust operates within a strong legal framework, backed by Article 85 TFEU and Article 47 of the Eurojust Regulation, supporting a firm foundation to legitimacy. Yet, the alignment of these actions with the broader principles of Article 21 TEU introduces critical questions about normative legitimacy. The Working Arrangements maintain a careful balance: they are non-binding, preserve Member State sovereignty, and explicitly safeguard the right to independent action. However, their lack of measurable outcomes and unclear operational impact weaken Eurojust’s legitimacy. Without transparency about the effectiveness of these external partnerships, Eurojust risks undermining the very credibility it seeks to build.

The EU’s reputation as a defender of democracy and human rights depends on whether it actually follows its own rules when dealing with third countries. Article 21 TEU is not just a statement of ideals, it sets real standards that the EU must live up to when it builds partnerships outside its borders. If external partnerships are to be sustainable and credible, they must reflect not just what the EU can do—but what it should do.